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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MICHELE McIVER BELL,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant,

]»

vs.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

])

HAROLD FREEMAN BELL,
Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 900183-CA
Trial Court No. 89148

]

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The final divorce decree from which this appeal is taken was
signed by the court on March 8, 1990.

The Notice of Appeal was

filed on April 3, 1990.
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this matter
by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 et
seq., Section 78-2A-1, et seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended),
and Rule 3 R. Utah Ct. App.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final divorce decree signed and
entered by Judge F.L. Gunnell of the First Judicial District
Court of Cache County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court committed error, given the

length of the

marriage, the earning of a Master's degree by

respondent during their marriage with appellant1 help, the
disparate financial circumstances and earning ability of the
parties, needs of the parties and relative standards of living of
the parties, in awarding appellant only $6,000 in alimony(
1

calculated at 250 per month for a period of two years)

payable

by awarding appellant the personal property in her possession
which the court valued at $6,000.
2.

Whether the trial court committed error in the valuation

and distribution of the personal property of the parties, because
the trial court failed to fully account for the personal property
acquired during the marriage, and failed to make a proper finding
as to its value.
3.

Whether the trial court committed error in not awarding

appellant all of her attorney fees and cost presented at the
trial court, respondent clearly having the greater income and
income earning capacity.
4.

Whether appellant is also entitled to an award of

attorney fees and cost on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Both parties were awarded a divorce on November 15, 1989.
A final divorce decree was entered on March 8, 1990.

An appeal

of the alimony, property division and attorney fees and cost
award was filed on April 3, 1990.

DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT
Trial was held on November 15, 1989.

After the finding of

jurisdiction, the presentation of evidence, and the hearing of
2

testimony from both parties, the trial court granted both parties
a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
The court awarded custody of the parties minor child to the
appellant, Michele Mclver Bell (hereinafter mother), subject to
reasonable visitation rights awarded to the respondent, Harold
Freeman Bell (hereinafter father).

The father was also ordered

to maintain current accident, health, and life insurance on the
child, and awarded any savings bonds currently being maintained
for the child.
The court ordered the father to continue to pay the mother
$450.00 in child support, an amount previously agreed upon by the
parties, which court noted was higher than the child support
guidelines.

The father is allowed to claim said child as a

dependent on his income tax which is contrary to the child
support guidlines.
The court awarded the parties real property to the father,
after finding that the said real property really has no equity.
The trial court awarded the mother $6,000.00 in alimony,
payable at $250.00 per month for two years.

In making the order,

the court stated that it found this divorce to be unusual in that
the parties pursued separate careers and has had a history of
marital problems.

The court found the parties standard of living

was "artificially established" and not helpful in its guidance.
Also, the court found that due to depleted assets and significant
debts, their individual earning capacities was their only asset.
In arriving at the above stated alimony figure, the court found
3

the mother's needs to be a "great deal", and the father's ability
to provide "essentially nothing".

The court explained that the

two year period was to provide the mother with a period of time
to adjust to the fact that she will be solely dependant on her
income thereafter.

However, in lieu of the awarded alimony, the

court awarded Ms. Bell all personal property in her possession as
described by Mr. Bell's exhibit number 14, with the exception to
three items in Mr. Bell's possession.

The court, in making such

an arrangement did not determine the value of all of the parties
personal property, and acknowledged that there was some question
as to the value of the property.

However, the court stated that

the values assigned by the parties were not challenged, and
there were no other alternatives.

The effect was to distribute

the parties personal property according to possession.
Finding that the parties have essentially established
separate identities, financially and otherwise, and the parties
individual debts to be roughly equal, the court ordered each
party to assume all debts and obligations in their own name.
The mother was awarded half of the father's retirement in
the military acquired during the marriag to be divided when
withdrawn, subject to a deduction of $3,800.00 which represents
the father's share of the mother's retirement fund that she
liquidated just prior to the divorce proceeding to support
herself.
Finding the father to have a limited ability to generate
money, but acknowledging that the court has not required him to
4

pay many of out-of-pocket expenses in the decree, the court
ordered him to pay $800.00 of the mother's attorney fees and
cost.
The court found the mother's salary to be $1,500 per month,
based upon her past earnings as a teacher which she has had to
forego for approximately two years while she pursued her Master's
degree at Utah State Unversity where she received $863.00 per
month as a teaching assistant.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

The parties were married on June 5, 1979 in Logan, Utah.

The mother filed for divorce on March 3, 1989.

A decree

granting the parties a divorce was entered on March 8, 1990.
2.

During the course of the marriage, one child was born on

August 28, 1990 to the parties, to wit. Stephanie Bell.

Now six

years of age.
3.

The father is currently a Major in the Air Force,

stationed at Holloman Air Force Base located in New Mexico,
(Transcript, page 4, lines 12-15) with a current monthly salary
of $3,660.00, or approximately $40,000.00 yearly.

(Transcript,

page 14, lines 11-16.)
4.

The mother was completeing a Masters degree at Utah

State University in education,

(Transcript, page 9, lines 11-13;

and page 11, lines 24-25.) receiving $863.00 per month as a
teaching assistant.

(Transcript, page 9, lines 14-16)
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5.

During the course of the parties approximately eleven

year marriage, Mr. Bell earned a Masters Degree,

(Transcript,

page 13, lines 5-6.), which assisted him in the advancement of
his military career.

(Transcript, page 165, lines 15-19.)

The

earning of the degree was a result of a joint effort from both
parties.

While Mr. Bell continued to work and provide for the

family financially, Ms. Bell assisted Mr. Bell with his school
work.

(Transcript, page 13, line 5-13, and page 165, lines 9-

14.)

The parties agreed the mother would assist the father with

his course work, and when the mother decided to return for her
graduate degree, the father would help her.

(Transcript, page

13, lines 5-13.)
6.

The mother began that effort to earn her Master's degree

while the parties were married, but she did not receive any
support from the father. (Transcript, page 14, lines 1-6.)
7.

The mother wants to continue her education and earn her

Ph.D., which would allow her more flexibility in a work schedule
and increase her potential salary, both of which would be
beneficial to the child of the parties.

(Transcript, page 12,

lines 9-16.)
8.

The parties were seperated several times during their

marriage because of the fathers abusive action, and due to
military assignments oversees.
9.

(Transcript, page 40, lines 5-8.)

The mother started classes at Utah State approximately

in the fall of 1988.

(Transcript, page 41, lines 8-11.)
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11.

While Mr. Bell was stationed in Koreafrom 1987 to 1988

he gave the mother between $1,600.00 to $1,800.00 per month.
(Transcript, page 166, lines 16-18.) After the father returned
from Korea, he refused to provide Ms. Bell with any further
financial support because she had decided on attending Utah State
without any discussion with him,(Transcript, page 154, line 23.).
By agreement he did pay her $450.00 per month in child support
for their daughter.
12.

Prior to Ms. Bell coming to Utah State Unversity, she

taught school in North Carolina for seven years where she had
accumulated $7,600.00 in a retirement fund.

In February, 1990,

she needed money for living expenses and was forced to liquidate
her retirement fund. (Transcript, page 32, lines 12-17.)
$4,000.00 of the fund she used for living expenses incurred prior
to arriving in Logan to attend Utah State.

The balance was used

for living expenses she incurred while in Logan, Utah, because
she was receiving no support from Mr. Bell.

(Transcript, page

33, lines 9-18. )
13.

While in Korea Mr. Bell purchased a dining room suite.

When he returned to New Mexico he purchased a stereo,
refrigerator, washer and dryer, (Transcript, page 158, lines 59.), which he did not list as marital property. (Transcript, page
169, lines 18-22.) Mr. Bell was also awarded a 1986 truck
purchased during the marriage.

(Transcript, page 182, lines 24-

25. )
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14.

The personal property in Ms. Bells' possession is

largely furniture approximately years old, being purchased when
the parties were married.

(Transcript, page, 23, lines 19-21.)

A list of the furniture is shown on Ms. Bell's exhibit 10. Ms.
Bell also has two automobiles one of which is no longer
operating, and was purchased for $500.00 when she arrived in
Logan, Utah.

(Transcript, page 16, line 5-14. )

Her other

vehicle, the 1982 Datsun, is located in North Carolina, being
untrustworthy to drive across the country in.
22, lines
15.

(Transcript, page

19-23.)
Mr. Bell agreed that Ms. Bell's attorney fees and cost

are reasonable, and that the case was "unduly" complicated, but
refused to assume her fees and cost asserting that, essentially,
the divorce is her fault.

(Transcript, page 132, lines 3-19.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

As a result of the courts failure to adequately and

fairly consider the financial circumstances of the parties, and
the contribution of each party to the marriage, the court abused
its discretion by awarding Ms. Bell only $6,000 in alimony.

Such

abuse of discretion was compounded by the fact that in lieu of
cash payments of $250 per month for a two year period, which
equals $6,000, Ms. Bell was awarded the personal property in her
possession, which the court found to be valued at $6,000.
2.

Due to the trial courts failure to make a full

account and valuation of the marital property involved in this
8

case, the courts ordered distribution of the ma
inequitable and constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
3.

The courts award of only $800.00 in attorney fees and

cost constitutes an abuse of its discretion in that all the
evidence presented sufficiently demonstrated that fees and cost
were reasonable, Ms. Bells' need, and that Mr. Bell was able to
provide for that need.
4.

Because the final decree was grossly inequitable, Ms.

Bell was forced to appeal the decree to defend her interest.
Such actions constitute reasonable and good faith grounds upon
which the appeal is pursued, and since Mr. Bell is able to
provide and Ms. Bell is not, she should be awarded fees and cost
on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.
BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF
BOTH PARTIES, WITH MR. BELL CLEARLY
HAVING THE GREATER EARNING ABILITY,
MS. BELL SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED
MORE THAN $6,000 IN ALIMONY.
In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), following precedent set forth
in the case of English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977),
firmly established and thoroughly analyzed the three factors that
must be considered in determining whether an alimony award is
fair and reasonable.

The three factors are:

1) the financial

conditions and needs of the wife; 2) the ability of the wife to

9

produce a sufficient income for herself; and 3) the ability of
the husband to provide support.
In applying these three factors to this case it become clear
that the trial court failed the adequately consider the facts of
this case in light of the three factors. Moreover, the record
makes apparent that as to Mr. Bells1 ability to pay, the trial
courts abuse of discretion is obvious.
Ms. Bells present financial circumstance is depressed and
even after the completion of her schooling will not be anywhere
comparable in earnings to what she could have had had she not
sacraficed to help Mr. Bell during their eleven year marriage
her needs are great.
$6,000 in alimony.

Nevertheless the court awarded her only

Ms. Bell is a single parent and a graduate

student at Utah State University.

Her budget, plaintiff's

exhibit 9, reflects that her monthly expense is approximately
$2,493.00.

To put this figure in context, it is proper to reduce

the figure by $450.00, the amount of child support awarded, as
the figure contemplates the expenses for the parties child.

This

would leave Ms. Bell with a monthly expense of $2043.00.
Ms. Bell's income amounts to only $863.00 a month from her
job as a graduate teaching assistant.

The figures balanced,

leave Ms. Bell with a monthly debt of $1180 per month.

This

order substantially reduces the standard of living Ms. Bell and
the child once enjoyed during the course of the eleven year
marriage.
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Further compelling is that some of the debts which appear on
Ms. Bell's monthly budget are debts that she incurred in the
remaining year and a half of the marriage in order to maintain
herself while completing her Masters degree.

This is so, because

during the last year and half the the father refused to provide
the her with any support except $450.00 per month which the
father made clear was solely intended as child support.
Considering the second factor.

The trial court found that

Ms. Bell's salary to be $1,500 per month.

Such a figure is a

historical salary based on what she made as a high school teacher
in North Carolina.

While this may reflect her earning ability,

it is improper and unfair to use the historical figure based on
the circumstance of the marriage and Ms. Bells' current
particular situation.
In Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988), the
appellant, inter alia, appealed an alimony award.

During the

course of the parties marriage, the defendant husband secured a
medical degree.

The court found that the degree enabled him to

earn approximately $100,000 per year.

Prior to the earning of

the medical degree, the parties endured a poor standard of
living.

This court found that relatively small alimony award

could be justified based on the Ms. Bells' previous standard of
living, however, "But such a result is unfair.- A divorce court
is a court of equity.

It is not equitable to preserve the status

of limited income for one party and affluence for the other when
the one sacrificed to help the other achieve such affluence."
11

Id. at 74.

While Martinez is factually distinguishable from this

case, the inequity of using appellants historical earnings to
mitigate the alimony award is analogous to the rational used in
Martinez.
During the parties ten year marriage Mr. Bell earned a
Masters degree.

While he did so at night and on the weekends so

that he could continue to work full time, such luxury was only
possible due to Ms. Bells' enormous contribution of taking care
of the household, their child, and assisting Mr. Bell in his
course work.

In other words, the efforts that went into earning

Mr. Bell's Masters degree was a joint effort from both parties.
Undoubtedly, as a result of Mr. Bell's Masters degree his earning
ability has increased as well as his ability to move up in rank
in the military.
Now Ms. Bell is completing her Masters degree, and desires
to continue to earn a doctorate degree so that both her and the
child's future will be promising.

While she is completing her

Masters degree she did not receive the same support from Mr.
Bell.

Without any financial support from her husband and no time

to maintain employment, Ms. Bell incurred debts and even had to
withdraw her retirement from her past employment in order to meet
living expenses.
Now the parties are divorced.

Mr. Bell and the trial court

deem it fair that Ms. Bell should only receive $6,000 in alimony
based, among other things, on her past earning ability.

While

such an equation may work in most cases, here, because Ms. Bells'
12

current needs are significantly comprised of debts she incurred
while in graduate school, during which time Mr. Bell provided no
financial support, to use her earning ability to mitigate the
alimony award overlooks Ms. Bells' contribution to Mr. Bell's
Masters degree and his neglect in failing to providing any
financial support while she was earning her Masters degree.
Certainly, $6,000 would not cover the expenses Ms. Bell incurred
for the year and a half Mr. Bell neglected to provide her with
financial support.

In other words, it "preserve[s] the status of

limited income for one party and affluence for the other..." Id.
at 74. Thus, since Ms. Bell "sacrificed to help" Mr. Bell
achieve his personal and career growth, he in turn should at
least be required to support her in achieving hers.

Ms. Bell

deserves at least an amount equal to the costs she incurred in
gaining her degree, which surely would be greater than the $6,000
awarded.
As to the third factor, the ability of Mr. Bell to
provide support, the court's error and abuse could not be
clearer.

The trial record reflects that Mr. Bell indicated that

his current salary is $3,660 per month or roughly $40,000 per
year.

As far as monthly expenses, Mr. Bell purports to have a

monthly expense of $5,090.
suspect.

The accuracy of this figure is

In regards to a balance Mr. Bell owes on a debt

to the

Air Force for a salary advance, he listed a balance of $2,000 in
his exhibit.

However, in questioning, his response was

$1,200.(Transcript page 160, lines 11-17.) He qualified the
13

conflict in figures by stating that deductions have been coming
out directly every mQnth from his salary.

This leads one to

believe that perhaps the $5,090 is quite inflated.

Nevertheless,

when itemized, the figure seems unreasonable.
In any event, the trial court concluded that Mr. Bell could
pay "essentially nothing". (Transcript page 182, lines 8-9.)

In

Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated
that the trial court should have taken into account the
"legitimate and reasonable needs" as they relate to the defendant
and his ability to pay.

Although in Jones the cost pertained to

respondent's business expenses as they related to his ability to
pay, here the situation is no different.

Mr. Bell's expenses

relate to his personal cost as they relate to his ability to pay.
The fact that the court concluded that Mr. Bell could pay
"essentially nothing" from a $40,000 per year salary undoubtedly
makes questionable whether the trial court made a "reasonable and
legitimate" assessment of his cost, and consequently, his ability
to pay alimony.
Considered collectively, these factors can only lead to the
belief that the trial court, through oversight or mistake, abused
its discretion and awarded an alimony amount far below a
reasonable and justified figure.
More disturbing, is that in lieu of a cash award, the court
awarded Ms. Bell all the personal property in her possession
thereby negating the alimony award altogether.

14

The trial court distributed the personal property of the
marriage according to who had possession.

The court valued the

personal property in Ms. Bell's possession at $6,000.00, but did
not value the property in Mr. Bell's possession.

The court then

used the personal property awarded, half of which belonged to Ms.
Bell as full satisfaction of the alimony payments.
By doing so, the trial court used in the personal property
distribution twice, which consequently, had the effect of not
awarding any alimony at all.
Therefore, not only did the trial court improperly evaluate
the three factors articulated in English and Jones to arrive at
an inequitable alimony award, but moreover, by using Ms. Bell's
share of the personal property to satisfy the alimony award, such
arrangement had the effect of denying Ms. Bell any of the alimony
award that the court just awarded.
II.
BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO ACCURATELY
ACCOUNT FOR AND VALUE THE INVOLVED MARITAL PROPERTY,
AND FAILED TO CONSIDER MS. BELL'S EXHIBITS
IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE VALUES OF THE
SAID PROPERTY, THE COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN THE VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION
OF THE PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE.
In Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987), this court
stated that in some cases, failure to include property valuations
constitute an abuse of discretion sufficient to require remand
for determination of values.

This was an agreement with the

rational articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
15

However, in both cases the

courts refused to remand the determination of the property values
because in each case it was appellant's counsel that failed to
include valuation figures for the property, a condition precedent
to appellate review regarding the equity of the distribution.
Here, Ms. Bell's counsel submitted property valuations as
evidence of the value of the property in Ms. Bells' possession as
well as values, to the best of Ms. Bells' knowledge, of that
property in Mr. Bells' possession.

Nonetheless, the court stated

that it had only one exhibit regarding property valuations, Mr.
Bell's.

See Transcript, page 183, lines 8-10.

Therefore, the

court forgot Ms. Bell's exhibit and determined the value of her
property solely from Mr. Bell's exhibit.

Moreover, the court

failed to scrutinize the accounting of the marital property and
determine a value for the personal property awarded Mr. Bell.
The collective effect of the courts actions was an
inaccurately value the personal property in possession of the
parties.

Accordingly, without an accurate accounting, and

valuation of all the marital property, the distribution thereof
was inequitable.
Mr. Bell maintained, however, that the property he acquired
in New Mexico and Korea was not marital property.

This is

incorrect, and contrary to statute and established law.
v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 ( Utah 1980).

Fletcher

According to Fletcher,

property acquired during the course of the marriage is considered
marital property subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.

16

In total, not only did the trial court fail to make a
finding as to the value of the property in Mr. Bell's possession;
but moreover, ignored the testimonial evidence presented at
trial, and failed to make a full account of all of the marital
property acquired by the parties during the marriage.

Property

that was in Mr. Bells' possession that he did not list but should
have.

The conclusion can only be that the property distribution

was inequitable, and an abuse of discretion by the trial court
afforded it pursuant to 30 U.C.A. 30-3-5 (1984).

Accordingly,

such clear abuse of discretion calls for a remand for a full
accounting and determination of the value of the property. Boyle,
735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987)
III.
BECAUSE ALL THE REQUIRED EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED, AND THAT EVIDENCE PRESENTED
WAS REASONABLE, AND BECAUSE MS. BELL
HAS ESTABLISHED HER NEED, THE AWARDED
ATTORNEYS FEES IS CLEARLY INADEQUATE.
In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), Utah Supreme
Court provided a thorough discussion of the principles that a
trial court should concern itself with in determining the award
of attorney fees.

The award must rest "on a basis of evidence of

need and reasonableness" Id. at 1384.

In elaborating on the

*"reasonableness" of the fees, the court articulated several
particular factors: number of hours dedicated, reasonableness of
the hourly rate in light of the difficulty of the case, results
accomplished, and the comparative rate charged.

While the court

did not go so far as to make these figures a condition precedent
17

for review of the award, the court did note that the hourly rate
should not be examined independently, but in the context of the
facts and emotion of the case.

As applied to this case, these

factors too clearly show that, an award of $800.00 for attorney
fees and cost for total bill of $2,350.00 in fees and $91.50 in
cost was inadequate.
Ms. Bell has adequately demonstrated her need.

Her monthly

budget demonstrates a need of $2,043, excluding child expenses
which is covered by child support.

Even with her earning ability

of $1500.00 per month runs a monthly debt of $500.00.

Based on

this it can only be said that her need is great, or in the words
of the trial court, a "great deal".

Nevertheless, while noting

that "I am not really ordering the defendant to make a lot of
out-of-pocket payment in this particular case", the trial court
ordered Mr. Bell to pay only $800.00 in fees and cost from a
$40,000.00 year salary.

Moreover, because Ms. Bell was not

awarded any cash alimony award, rather in lieu of cash, was
awarded the personal property in her possession, the balance of
her fees only makes her financial position more compromising.
As to the reasonableness of the fees and cost, the
inadequacy is no less compelling.

This divorce was not "usual".

At the time of the divorce the parties lived in separate states.
Mr. Bell filed a motion to stay proceedings becauseof the
Soldier's and Sailor's Relief Act, which was contested.

Much of

their personal property was spread throughout various locations.
The parties, for at least the two years prior to the action,
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created numerous loans by several lenders.

The collective effect

of all this made the Discovery, organization, and strategy of the
case difficult and complex.

Indeed, the services rendered ran

"the gamut of the complexities of the human condition." Id. at
1385.
In light of the above, the fees totaled $2,350.00.

This was

based on an hourly rate of $100.00 out of court, and $110.00 in
court, of which 16.0 hours and 6.0 hours were expended
respectively.

A signed affidavit describing the above figures

including a break down of the specific action taken, by date
rendered, was submitted to support the charged fees.
reasonableness of the fees is evident.

The

It is not uncommon, as

the above cited case demonstrates, for fees in divorce actions to
reach upwards of $10,000 or more.

Concededly, the above cited

case was more involved, but proportionately, the fees charged in
this case would likely fall well below if the cases were
factually similar.
Based upon the circumstances of the parties at the time of
the divorce, and the difficulties that such circumstances created
in the litigation of the case as they substantiate the
reasonableness in the fees and cost charged, and the financial
situation of both parties with Ms. Bell showing a true need and
Mr. Bell showing an ability to contribute, Ms. Bell as a matter
of equity, should be entitled to a remand for a more equitable
determination of the awarded fees and costs.
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IV.
BECAUSE OF MS. BELL'S DEMONSTRATED NEED,
MR. BELL'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE, AND THE
REASONABLE AND GOOD FAITH GROUNDS UPON
WHICH THIS APPEAL IS BASED, MS. BELL SHOULD
BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES AND COST ON APPEAL.
Not unlike the principles which guide a trial court in the
award of attorney fees and cost at the trial level, an award of
attorney fees and cost on appeal should also consider the
appealing partys1 needs and the opposing partys' ability to pay.
In addition, however, because of the implicit potential abuse of
the appellate procedure, especially in divorce proceedings,
appellate courts have also required that in order to prevail in
such a request, there must be a showing of good faith and
reasonableness upon which the appeal is pursued.

Re Marriage of

Davis, 141 Cal.App.3d 71 (1st. Dist. 1983).
The Utah Supreme Court has generally espoused the same
principles.

Where a party was required to defend an appeal,

later to be found without merit, the defending party, upon a
reasonable and proper showing, was afforded a remand to the trial
court for the determination of attorney fees and cost on appeal.
See, Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (1977); and Carter v.
Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978).
Although in the above cited cases, the requesting party was
the defendant, the principles of equity are no different in this
case simply because the requesting party is the appellant.

Here,

Ms. Bell, in a sense, is defending her interest to a divorce
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decree which she asserts and has argued above to be unfair.
Thus, she is a appellant by procedure, but a defendant by nature.
The reasonableness and good faith grounds upon which this
appeal is based has been fully discussed above.

Briefly, Ms.

Bell has demonstrated that she is clearly the disadvantaged party
financially.

The court finding her needs to be a "great deal",

awarded her $6,000.00 in alimony.

However, in lieu of cash

payments, she was awarded all the personal marital property in
her possession, which she should have been entitled to anyway as
her fair share of the said marital property.
negate the awarded alimony altogether.

The effect was to

Additionally, the trial

court distributed the personal marital property without first
making a full account and valuation of said property thereby
resulting in an inequitable distribution.

It is upon these

reasonable and valid grounds, that Ms. Bell now appeals.
As to Ms. Bells' needs, and Mr. Bells' ability to pay, the
current circumstances of the parties provide an adequate
illustration.

Ms. Bell is a graduate student with an earning

ability of $1,500.00 per month.

She is a single parent, with a

significant amount of debt which was largely due to her student
status.

She has relatively few assets. Mr. Bell, on the other

hand, has an established military career as an Officer with a
current yearly salary of $40,000. Such disparity demonstrates
the needs and ability of each party respectively.
In both Ehninger and Carter, due to the fact that the
requesting party was forced to defend the appeal, which in the
21

later was found to be without merit, and in the former was
affirmed in the later, said party was entitled to have such
request remanded to the trial court for a reasonable and proper
amount of fees and cost on appeal.
to institute this action.

Here, Ms. Bell was "forced"

Negotiations to settle failed, leaving

only the appellate process as a viable means of protecting her
interest from an improper and inequitable divorce decree.

A

fortiori, Ms. Bell should be entitled to the same remedy as the
requesting parties were in the above cited cases.
CONCLUSION
Based on the aforementioned reasons, Ms, Bell respectfully
request this court to remand the final divorce decree entered in
this case to the trial court for a review of the alimony award,
property distribution and awarded attorney fees and cost
contained within said decree.
Ms. Bell further request that she be awarded attorney fees
and cost on appeal.
Dated this 21st day of June, 1990.
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN

LYLElW. HILLYARD
(J
^
(Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed, postpaid, to
Defendant/Respondent Freeman Harold Bell, at 1509 Pinon Drive
Alamorgordo, New Mexico 88310, this 21st day of June, 1990.

Lyle/W. Hillyard L/
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHELE McIVER BELL,
])

Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I

FREEMAN HAROLD BELL,

]•

Defendant.

Civil No. 890000148

]

This matter came on for hearing on the 15th day of
November, 1989, before the Honorable. F. L. Gunnell, District
Court Judge.

Personally appeared the Plaintiff and her

attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and his
attorney, Tim W. Healy.

The parties were sworn and testified

and evidence was presented.

The Court having heard the

testimony and reviewed the evidence, and being fully advised
in the premises, makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Plaintiff is now and has been for more than

three months immediately preceding the filing of this action,
a resident of the County of Cache, State of Utah.
2.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married to

each other on the 5th day of June, 1979, in Logan, State of
Utah, and ever since that time have been and now are husband
and wife*

A - 1

3. That one child has been born as issue of this
marriage, namely:

STEFANIE BELL, born August 28, 1983, and no

more children are expected.
4.

That Plaintiff is the fit and proper person to be

awarded the care, custody, and control of the said minor child
subject to reasonable visitation rights of the Defendant to
CM

3

include 30 continuous days each summer, with the Plaintiff to

5

decide by May 1st of each year, in consultation with
Defendant, when those 30 days will begin and Defendant to pay

jE

all costs of transportation.

The parties were advised that if

O

jf

Stefanie becomes really homesick and staying further with

(0

£

Defendant will be seriously disruptive, she should be sent

<

«

back to Plaintiff and the parties should work with each other

§

maturely and allow telephone calls and contacts. Further,

(0
-J

o

«
z
o

£

Defendant is allowed to telephone the child at 10:00 a.m. at
the child's residence Saturday or Sunday and to speak for up

u
Q
Q

f.
<
J
(0

u

encouraged
to call
the child
to. and
Defendant
is
to 20 minutes.
Thewhenever
child should
call wants
Defendant
is
to give Plaintiff 48 hours notice if he is in the area and

t
o

wants to visit with the child.

<

discuss the other negatively before the child.
5.

That neither party is to

That during the course of the marriage,

irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties
making it impossible to continue the marriage and each party
should be granted a divorce, one from the other.

-2A

- 2

6.

That this marriage had deteriorated and there is no

possibility of reconciliation; therefore, the statutory
waiting periods before this divorce is made final should be
waived.
7.

That for the purposes of child support, Plaintiff's

income is set at $1,500.00 a month and Defendant's is set at
5

$3,660.00 a month, and child support should be $450.00 a

i

H

month, which Defendant is currently paying and is in excess

z

§

of the Uniform Child Support Schedule with this support abated

o
-J

one-half for the 30 days visitation each summer.
8.

That a Withhold and Deliver Order in favor the

"

Plaintiff
be prepared
and issued
by the Clerktoof this
Court, whoshould
is authorized
to deliver
it immediately

z
111

Defendant's employer pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section

(0
-I

o

78-45b-5, upon the filing of Plaintiff's Affidavit that the

z

j£

Defendant is over 30 days delinquent in his monthly obligation

hi
Q

<

ri
x

£

to pay child support.
9.

That Plaintiff should be allowed to claim the child

-j

*

as a dependent for income tax purposes, but the parties may

t
o

calculate the net advantage of allowing Defendant to claim the

<

child and if there is a net savings and they qualify under IRS
rules, then Defendant may claim the child and reimburse the
Plaintiff for the income tax she has to pay because of the
loss of the child as a dependent and split the net savings
between the parties.

-3A -3

10.

That Defendant should be awarded the real property

the parties have acquired at 3908 Foster Drive in
Fayetteville, North Carolina, subject to his assuming all the
debts, and Plaintiff shall sign any necessary papers and
Defendant shall hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
11.
?

<D

That regarding alimony, because the standard of

living is based on debt and wasted assets and not established

z

£
z
g

by the lifestyle and in lieu of any alimony, Plaintiff is
awarded all the personal property now in her possession

o
-J

x
O

which the Court places a value of $6,000.00 based on the
husband's Exhibit No. 14.

z
I(0
I-

12.

That each party should be ordered to assume the

<
UJ

£

debts in their own name.
13. That regarding retirement, Plaintiff should be

0)
_J

<,
z
o
0)

ir

awarded an interest in Defendantf s military retirement based
on the Woodward formula, subject to a reduction of $3,800.00

u
Q

<

when that retirement is paid as being Defendant's one-half of

6
x

J

Plaintiff's retirement that she cashed in in February of 1989.

-j
-J

1
<0
LU
U

£

14. That Defendant should maintain all insurance at its
current level for the child's benefit so long as there is a

o

<

child support obligation; provided, however, that in the event
Defendant has additional natural children, they may be
included as co-beneficiaries on the existing life insurance
and death benefit plans.

In the event that Defendant acquires

additional life insurance or death benefit plans in the future
-4A - 4

and names after-born children as beneficiaries, he shall also
include Stefanie as a co-beneficiary.
15.

That Defendant should pay Plaintiff $800.00 on her

attorney fees plus costs.
16.

That the 15 savings bonds that Defendant has

acquired to date should be maintained for the child.
M
CD

X
<
3
Z
<
o
J

I
»oc
o
z
£
i(0

17.

That the Defendant should maintain health and

accident insurance on the minor child as long as there is a
child support obligation and that all uninsured medical bills
will be paid 50 percent by each party, except the custodial
parent will pay the routine office calls.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the

<

IO

following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Z
u

That an order should be entered in accordance with the
z
o
(A
(T
kl
Q

Z
<

foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this

^

day of ^iLA/lAtLL , 1990.

Q
tr

<
>-

BY THE COURT:

j

J

u
u

fa 10 j \ v L v ^ i /

Uu
k.

O
<

IF. U.

GUNNELL

District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM

Attorney for Defer*
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MICHELE McIVER BELL,
Plaintiff,

])

DECREE AND ORDER
FOR DIVORCE

]1

Civil No. 890000148

VS.

FREEMAN HAROLD BELL,
Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on the 15th day of
November, 1989, before the Honorable F. L. Gunnell, District
Court Judge.

Personally appeared the Plaintiff and her

attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and his
attorney, Tim W. Healy.

The parties were sworn and testified

and evidence was presented.

The Court having heard the

testimony and reviewed the evidence, and being fully advised
in the premises, and having heretofore made its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, enters the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That Plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce from

the Defendant and the Defendant is awarded a decree of divorce
from the Plaintiff to become final upon signing.
2.

That Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody, and

control of the minor child of the parties, to-wit:

STEFANIE

BELL, born August 28, 1983, subject to reasonable visitation

A-6

rights of the Defendant to include 30 continuous days each
summer with the Plaintiff to decide by May 1st of each year,
in consultation with Defendant, when those 30 days will begin
and Defendant to pay all costs of transportation.

The

parties were advised that if Stefanie becomes really homesick
and staying further with Defendant will be seriously
CM

5

disruptive, she should be sent back to Plaintiff and the

5

parties should work with each other maturely and allow

z
z

5

telephone calls and contacts. Further, Defendant is allowed

jE

to telephone the child at 10:00 a.m. at the child's residence

O

*

Saturday or Sunday and to speak for up to 20 minutes. The

(A
X

£

child should call Defendant and is encouraged to call whenever

<

«

the child wants to. Defendant is to give Plaintiff 48 hours

u

notice if he is in the area and wants to visit with the child.

0)
-I

z
o
o
«
(0

tr

U
Q

<

ri
<r

>

That neither party is to discuss the other negatively before
the child.
3.

That Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff as and

for child support, the sum of $450.00 a month, which support
shall be abated one-half for the 30 days visitation each

to

•*

tu

o

t
o

summer.

<

4.

That a Withhold and Deliver Order in favor the

Plaintiff shall be prepared and issued by the Clerk of this
Court, who is authorized to deliver it immediately to
Defendant's employer pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-45b-5, upon the filing of Plaintiff's Affidavit that the
-2-
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Defendant is over 30 days delinquent in his monthly obligation
to pay child support.
5.

That Plaintiff is allowed to claim the child as a

dependent for income tax purposes, but the parties may
calculate the net advantage of allowing Defendant to claim the
child and if there is a net savings and they qualify under IRS
j

rules, then Defendant may claim the child and reimburse the

i

fc; Plaintiff for the income tax she has to pay because of the
2

o
o
-j

loss of the child as a dependent and split the net savings

jE

between the parties.

o
fc

6.

That Defendant is awarded the real property the

parties have acquired at 3908 Foster Drive in Fayetteville,
North Carolina, subject to his assuming all the debts, and
Plaintiff shall sign any necessary papers and Defendant shall
2

hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom.

o
u>
X

7.

That in lieu of any alimony, Plaintiff is awarded all

Id
Q

<
ri
>

the personal property now in her possession.
8.

That each party is ordered to assume the debts in

their own name.
V)
Id

U

t
o
<

9.

That Plaintiff is awarded an interest in Defendant's

military retirement based on the Woodward formula, subject to
a reduction of $3,800.00 when that retirement is paid as being
Defendant's one-half of Plaintiff's retirement that she cashed
in in February of 1989.
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10.

That Defendant is ordered to maintain all insurance

at its current level for Stephanie's benefit so long as there
is a child support obligation; provided, however, that in the
event Defendant has additional natural children, Defendant
may include them as co-beneficiaries on the existing life
insurance or death benefit plans.
5

In the event that

Defendant acquires additional life insurance or death benefit

CO

I

H
g

plans in the future and names after-born children as
beneficiaries, Defendant is ordered to also include Stefanie

i

as a co-beneficiary.

<r
o

*

11. That Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff $800.00
on her attorney fees plus costs.
12.

g

That Defendant is ordered to maintain for the said

minor child the 15 savings bonds that Defendant has acquired

(0
-I

°

to date.

z

8
c

13. That the Defendant is ordered to maintain health and

kl
Q

<

accident insurance on the minor child as long as there is a

d

J

child support obligation, and that Plaintiff and Defendant are

J
j

1

ordered to pay 50 percent of all uninsured medical bills,

w

c

<
o

except
the this
custodial
parent
pay the, routine
DATED
% day
of will
^7l/\nAi\L
1990. office calls,
BY THE COURT: ,
')

'. /L. GUtfNELL
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FO;
Tim -tfr-'Healy
Attorney for Defendajy6
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